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the low prevalence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. We do 
not have a clear explanation for how the 2 residents 
became infected after the introduction of these mea-
sures; we were unable to determine whether surveys 
were useful tools. It is possible that routine testing 
discouraged persons with symptoms from visit-
ing. We observed a very low rate of positive tests 
in the LTCF staff; only 1 staff member tested posi-
tive. Potential explanations for this low rate could 
be that testing had an impact on behavior, symptom 
screening kept ill staff home, or the virus was less 
prevalent in the community surrounding the LTCF. 
Although symptom surveys were used and absentee 
rates were normal, staff did not report symptoms as 
a reason for missed work. Despite these limitations, 
this study suggests that a proper testing strategy 
coupled with other measures may result in protec-
tion of vulnerable populations.
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Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) superspreading events are par-
ticularly linked to indoor settings, such as religious 
venues (1), restaurants (2), and bars or nightclubs 
(3–6). To provide further details on the extent and 
transmission dynamics in nightclubs, we describe a 
SARS-CoV-2 outbreak related to a Berlin, Germany, 
nightclub during the early phase of the coronavirus 
disease (COVID-19) pandemic, before infection pre-
vention measures were applied.
On March 5, 2020, contact tracing activities in 
Berlin revealed several COVID-19 cases linked by 
visiting the same nightclub, club X, on February 29, 
2020 (event 1). Estimates suggest ≈300 guests attend-
ed event 1. Club X then held other events: event 2 
with ≈150 guests on March 2 and event 3 with ≈200 
guests on March 5. On March 6, the local health 
We report an outbreak of coronavirus disease with 74 
cases related to a nightclub in Germany in March 2020. 
Staff members were particularly affected (attack rate 
56%) and likely caused sustained viral transmission after 
an event at the club. This outbreak illustrates the poten-
tial for superspreader events and corroborates current 
club closures.
1These first authors contributed equally to this article.
2These senior authors contributed equally to this article.
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authority of Mitte district, Berlin, published an-
nouncements in local newspapers and on social 
media to identify other attendees of the events. 
Everyone attending >1 event was categorized as a 
high-risk contact person and ordered to self-quaran-
tine for 14 days. If symptoms occurred, laboratory 
testing was recommended. Mandatory case notifica-
tion occurred from the laboratory to the local health 
authority based on Germany’s Protection against In-
fection Act (7). Due to the increasing spread of CO-
VID-19, on March 16, 2020, government authorities 
in Germany prohibited social gatherings, including 
events in nightclubs, until further notice.
Confirmed cases in the outbreak were de-
fined as persons with laboratory-confirmed SARS-
CoV-2 (Appendix, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/EID/
article/27/2/20-4443-App1.pdf). We retrieved dates 
of symptom onset and sociodemographic data of 64 
outbreak cases from the national infectious diseases 
notification database. We considered staff and per-
sons who attended any event at club X to have first-
generation cases and their contacts to have second-
generation cases. 
We interviewed 44 persons with first-gener-
ation cases whose contact information was avail-
able and with all 16 club X staff members who 
worked any of the 3 events. For staff members 
who were not tested after the events or who tested 
negative despite reporting symptoms, we offered 
SARS-CoV-2 antibody testing 3 months after the 
outbreak to ascertain their infection status. We 
also mapped the space inside club X (Appendix 
Figure 1).
In total, 74 reported cases were linked to the out-
break. Median age was 30 (range 2–63) years; cases 
were equally distributed by sex, 37 female (50%) and 
37 male (50%). Among 41 first-generation cases with 
known date of symptom onset and only 1 exposure, 
the median incubation period was 4 days (interquar-
tile range 3–6 days). The calculated attack rates (ARs) 
show that guests attending event 1 were particularly 
affected. Staff pooled over all events had the highest 
risk for infection (AR 56%) (Table).
Among guests, 1 PCR-confirmed case had self-re-
ported initial symptoms 1 day before attending event 
1 and could be a potential source of the outbreak. The 
most probable source for continued viral transmis-
sion at event 3 was a PCR-confirmed case in a staff 
member working event 1 and event 3, with symptom 
onset 1 day before event 3. Overall, staff members re-
ported symptom onset at a later stage of the outbreak 
than guests (Figure).
 
Table. Calculated attack rates for identified coronavirus disease outbreak cases among staff members and guests attending events in 
a nightclub, Berlin, Germany, March 2020* 
Characteristics Cases, no. (%) 
No. attending 
Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
Estimated guests† – 300 150 200 
Staff members, n = 16‡ – 11 6 11 
Total cases 74 (100)    
Cases by generation§     
 First-generation, n = 55 55 (74.3)    
  Guests¶ 46 (83.6) 39 0 3 
  Staff 9 (16.4) – – – 
 Second-generation, n = 10 10 (13.5) – – – 
 Generation unknown, n = 9 9 (12.2) – – – 
Cases by case definition#     
 Confirmed cases, n = 72 72 (97.3) – – – 
  PCR-confirmed 70 (97.2) – – – 
  Antibody testing-confirmed 2 (2.8) – – – 
 Probable cases 2 (2.7) – – – 
Attack rate, %** Pooled over all events Event 1 Event 2 Event 3 
 Guests – 13 – 2 
 Staff 56 – – – 
*Event-related case numbers are shown only for first-generation guest cases as all of them confirmed to only have attended 1 of the 3 events. –, value 
not calculated. 
†The exact number of guests attending the events is unknown. For event 1, an estimate of attending guests was based on the maximum capacity of the 
club; staff and contacted guests confirmed that the club was running at full capacity. For events 2 and 3, the club owner provided estimates listed here. 
‡Most staff members attended  >2 of the events. 
§First-generation cases were defined as cases exposed during event 1, 2, or 3. Second-generation cases were defined as cases without exposure at 
club X but with exposure to first-generation cases. Cases of unknown generation were confirmed cases of the outbreak but without contact information to 
reveal whether they were first- or second-generation cases. 
¶All guests contacted confirmed they attended only 1 of the 3 events. Information on the event of exposure was available for 42 first-generation cases 
among guests. No guest case reported visiting club X for event 2. 
#The outbreak case definition is described in the Appendix (https://www.nc.cdc.gov/EID/article/27/2/20-4443-App1.pdf). All cases confirmed by antibody 
testing were otherwise probable cases. 
**Calculation of primary attack rates for guests was based on approximations for the denominator, the number of guests attending. Because most staff 
members were exposed repeatedly while working at >1 event we separately calculated attack rates for staff pooled over all events. 
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SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequencing was 
performed on 17 available patient samples to assess 
clustering of sequences. Sequencing revealed that 10 
cases among event 1 guests, 2 second-generation cas-
es, and 5 cases of unknown generation all grouped 
within clade G (GISAID, https://www.gisaid.org) 
and B.1 (Pangolin clade naming) (Appendix Figure 
2). This clade also was observed in the SARS-CoV-2 
outbreak in Italy and many later outbreaks in Eu-
rope (8). Sequences from 11 samples were identi-
cal. The other 6 samples were otherwise identical, 
but had slight differences; 1 sequence had 1 position 
with ambiguous nucleotides; 3 other sequences had 
3 positions with ambiguous nucleotides; 1 sequence 
had a substitution in the 3′ untranslated region; and 
sequences from 2 cases, in a couple who attended 
event 1, had an identical substitution in the N gene 
(Appendix Table 1). This substitution could hint to 
a second independent transmission cluster compris-
ing these 2 cases, but all observed sequence variants 
also can be explained by sporadic mutation events. 
Thus, the sequence data do not provide evidence 
against a single person as the outbreak source (Ap-
pendix Figure 2).
The large number of cases from event 1, the rela-
tively low median incubation period (4 days) for first-
generation cases, and the close genetic relatedness 
of the sequenced viruses corroborate the theory of 
transmission from a single person and the potential 
for superspreading in a nightclub when no social dis-
tancing measures are applied. This outbreak further 
illustrates the potential role of nightclub staff mem-
bers in transmission. AR among staff was particularly 
high (56%), showing they had a particularly high risk 
for infection. Because 1 staff member appears to have 
been infected at event 1, then worked with symptoms 
at event 3, continued viral transmission could have 
been caused by staff. However, without sequencing 
data for all cases, staff contribution to viral transmis-
sion cannot be confirmed. Nonetheless, once ease of 
restrictions is considered, our study suggests that in-
fection protection should be targeted particularly to-
ward staff in nightclubs and bars.
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Figure. Date of symptom 
onset among 64 coronavirus 
disease cases linked to an 
outbreak in a nightclub, Berlin, 
Germany, March 2020. The 
asterisks indicate cases with 
symptom onset prior attending 
event 1 (symptom onset on 
February 28, 2020) and event 
3 (symptom onset on March 
4, 2020). No guests among 
cases reported attending event 
2, but all attended either event 
1 or event 3. No staff among 
cases attended only event 2; all 
attended event 1, event 3, or 
both events.
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Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) symptoms can encompass a Kawasaki disease–like multisys-
tem inflammatory syndrome and skin manifesta-
tions that accompany common viral infections such 
as chickenpox and measles (1,2). Some of the earli-
est reports of COVID-19 cutaneous manifestations 
came from dermatologists in Italy. In fact, Italy was 
the first Western country severely hit by the CO-
VID-19 epidemic. The first known COVID-19 case 
in Italy was reported in the town of Codogno in 
the Lombardy region on February 21, 2020. How-
ever, some evidence suggests that severe acute re-
spiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) 
had been circulating unnoticed for several weeks 
in Lombardy before the first official detection (3). 
Phylogenetic studies highlighted an early circula-
tion of SARS-CoV-2 in Italy and suggest multiple 
introductions of the virus from China and Ger-
many, followed by an autochthonous transmission 
(4,5). Furthermore, environmental surveillance has 
unequivocally demonstrated the presence of the vi-
rus, at concentrations comparable to those obtained 
from samples collected at later stages of the pan-
demic, in the untreated wastewater of the Milan 
area as early as mid-December 2019 (6).
We identified severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 RNA in an oropharyngeal swab specimen 
collected from a child with suspected measles in early 
December 2019, ≈3 months before the first identified 
coronavirus disease case in Italy. This finding expands 
our knowledge on timing and mapping of novel coronavi-
rus transmission pathways.
1These authors contributed equally to this article.
